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I.  INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF INCORPORATION                                       
FOR ORIGINALIST THEORY 
Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
incorporate the Bill of Rights contained in the first eight amendments?  
And how should an originalist answer that question?  This paper focuses 
on the latter question—the issues of originalist theory that are raised by 
judicial and scholarly debates over what is called “incorporation.”  
Before we dig into substance of the debate, we need to do some initial 
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clarifying work by answering the questions, “what is originalism?” and 
“what is incorporation?” 
A.  What is Originalism? 
The term “originalism” is itself disputed.1  Indeed, Thomas Colby and 
Peter Smith claim to have demonstrated “that, despite the suggestion of 
originalist rhetoric, originalism is not a single, coherent, unified theory 
of constitutional interpretation, but is rather a disparate collection of 
distinct constitutional theories that share little more than a misleading 
reliance on a common label.”2  At the other end of the spectrum, Mitch 
Berman claims that the term “Originalism” (with a capital “O”) should 
be reserved for what he calls “Strong Originalism”—the view that the 
original meaning of the constitution should be the exclusive (or almost 
exclusive) determinant of constitutional meaning.3  Neither view is correct.  
Originalism is best viewed as a family of theories that characteristically 
affirm two theses: 
The Fixation Thesis asserts that the linguistic meaning (or 
semantic content) of each constitutional provision was fixed at 
the time of origin (that is, the time at which each provision was 
framed and ratified). 
The Contribution Thesis asserts that the semantic content of 
the Constitution contributes to the legal content of constitutional 
doctrine:4 characteristically, originalists claim that constitutional 
doctrine must be consistent with the “original meaning.” 
Although almost all self-identified originalists affirm some version of 
the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis, originalists have taken a 
 
 1. This Article utilizes many of the ideas that are developed in more depth and 
detail in Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 
07-24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. 
 2. Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009).  
 3. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2009). 
 4. The phrase “constitutional doctrine” is used to refer to the content of 
articulated constitutional norms (in the broad sense that includes principles, standards, 
and rules in the narrow sense)—although doctrine might be limited to judicial doctrines, 
I use that term to encompass constitutional norms both inside and outside the court.  I use 
the phrase “constitutional law” to encompass both “the Constitution” (the written document) 
and constitutional doctrine, but by this usage, I do not mean to make any 
metajurisprudential claims about the nature of law. 
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variety of positions about the question as to what fixes original meaning 
and why original meaning does or should contribute to and constrain 
constitutional doctrine. 
As to what fixes original meaning, originalist theory has evolved.  In 
the contemporary period, early originalist theory emphasized the “original 
intentions of the framers.”  Later originalists emphasized the “original 
understandings of the ratifiers,” and then the “original public meaning” 
of the constitutional text.  Although the dominant strain of contemporary 
originalism emphasizes “public meaning,” disagreement among originalists 
persist—with Richard Kay,5 Larry Alexander,6 Sai Prakash,7 Steven 
Smith,8 and others continuing to adhere to an intentionalist version of 
originalism.9  The gap between internationalism and public meaning may 
actually be quite narrow: because the relevant author of a constitution 
(i.e., the framers or ratifiers) is likely to have semantic intentions that 
point to public meanings, the conventional semantic meaning of the 
constitution and the intended meaning are likely to converge in most or 
even almost all cases.10 
As to why original meaning should contribute to and constrain 
constitutional doctrine, originalists have advanced a variety of positions 
including: 
Popular Sovereignty—some originalists have argued that the 
original meaning should constrain constitutional interpretation 
because the democratic legitimacy of the constitution derives 
from its ratification by democratic procedures: it was the “original 
meaning” that was authorized through such procedures.11 
 
 5. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009). 
 6. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You're Speaking?” 
Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 980–
81 (2004). 
 7. See id. 
 8. See STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 122-23, 125 (Harv. Univ. Press 2004). 
 9. See Lawrence B. Solum, 103 District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 
NW. U. L. REV. 923 (2009) (summarizing the development of originalist theory).  The case 
against intentionalism is made in detail in Semantic Originalism, supra note 1. 
 10. Convergence will depend on the particular form of original-intentions originalism.  
If the relevant intentions are “semantic intentions” (intentions concerning the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional text), then the argument for convergence in text goes through.  
But if the relevant intentional states are purposes, motives, or expectations, then original-
intentions originalism and original-meaning originalism will diverge in a wide variety of 
cases. 
 11. See Kurt Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2007). But see Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Misunderstood 
Relationship between Originalism and Popular Sovereignty, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
485, 486 (2008). 
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Writtenness—other constitutional theorists have argued that 
the authority of the original meaning is entailed by the fact that 
the Constitution is written: the point or purpose of writtenness 
is to fix and constrain the content of constitutional doctrine.12 
Supermajoritarianism—and still other originalists have 
emphasized the notion that the original meaning of the Constitution 
was adopted through supermajoritarian procedures that produce 
legal rules with better consequences than legal rules that are not 
adopted through such procedures.13 
The Rule of Law—another argument for originalism emphasizes 
the constraining force of fixed semantic content and the predictability, 
certainty, and stability that such constraint fosters;14 the flip side 
of this argument is the originalist critique of the discretion 
conferred by constitutional practice that allows judges to engage 
in constitutional practice that resorts to the judge’s own beliefs 
about fundamental values. 
Legal Practice—and finally, some originalists argue that the 
conventions of legal practice recognize that the linguistic meaning 
of the Constitution constrains officials who engage in constitutional 
practice, including the Justices of the Supreme Court: fidelity to 
law requires adherence to such practices absent the extraordinary 
conditions that warrant official lawlessness.15 
For the most part, this Article will operate within the framework of what 
has been called “the New Originalism”16 or “original public meaning 
originalism.”  That is, the discussions of originalist theory will begin with 
the assumption that the “original meaning of each constitutional 
 
 12. See generally Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional 
Interpretation (Oct. 8, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1281066) (discussing and criticizing argument from writtenness). 
 13. See John McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 
TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=288344. 
 14. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 429 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent With 
Original Meaning: Not As Radical As It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 259 (2005); 
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 551-52 (1994). 
 15. I argue for this conclusion in Semantic Originalism, supra note 1. 
 16. Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEORGETOWN J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
599 (2004). 
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provision” was fixed at the time of origin by conventional semantic 
meaning of the words and phrases and by the conventions of syntax and 
grammar at the time that the provision in question was framed and 
ratified.  But that starting assumption may be incomplete or partial.  For 
example, it is possible that the constitutional text includes “terms of art,” 
words or phrases like “letters of marquee and reprisal” or “natural born 
citizen” which lacked a “public meaning” for ordinary citizens but 
which, via a division of linguistic labor, had a conventional semantic 
meaning fixed by the usage of a linguistic subgroup (e.g., those learned 
in the law).17 
In addition, this Article adopts the distinction between “original meaning” 
and “original applications” or “original expected applications.” The 
phrase “original expected applications” originates with Jack Balkin,18 
but Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman articulated a similar distinction 
between “original meaning” and “original expectations” in their important 
1998 article, The Meaning of Original Meaning.19  The point of the 
distinction is that the linguistic meaning (or semantic content) of a text is 
not the same as expectations about the application of that meaning to 
future cases.  Accepting this distinction does not imply that evidence 
about expected applications is not relevant (epistemically) to the 
determination of the conventional semantic meaning of the constitutional 
text: expected applications of a text may offer evidence about its 
meanings.  Rather, the implication is that expectations about applications 
are neither decisive evidence of meaning nor meaning itself. 
Moreover, the version of originalist theory that serves as the baseline 
for the discussion will embrace the distinction between “constitutional 
interpretation,” understood as the enterprise of discerning the linguistic 
meaning or semantic content of the Constitution, and “constitutional 
construction,” which we might tentatively define as the activity of 
further specifying constitutional rules when the original public meaning 
of the text is vague or underdeterminate.20  This distinction explicitly 
 
 17. See Solum, supra note 1. 
 18. See Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENTARY 
291, 295–26 (2007); Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 448 (2008); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin. 
blogspot.com/2007/07/clarence-thomass-originalism.html (July 11, 2007, 10:11 EST); Jack 
Balkin, Alive and Kicking, YALE LAW SCHOOL, Sept. 19, 2005,  http://www.law.yale.edu/ 
news/1846.htm; see also Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009). 
 19. Mark Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. 
L.J. 569, 573–74 (1998). 
 20. The distinction is strongly associated with Randy Barnett and Keith Whittington. 
RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 88 (2004); KEITH WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5 (1999); KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
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acknowledges what we might call the fact of constitutional 
underdeterminacy.21  The linguistic meaning of the Constitution does 
not provide fully determinate answers to all the possible or actual questions 
that could be or have been raised.  Characteristically, originalist theory 
asserts that the doctrines of constitutional law that are articulated to 
resolve such underdeterminacies must be consistent with the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional text, but stronger or weaker variations are 
possible. 
Finally, the fact of constitutional underdeterminacy that motivates the 
distinction between “interpretation” and “construction” can be clarified 
by distinguishing between “vagueness” and “ambiguity.” The terms 
“vague” and “ambiguous” are used in both precise and imprecise senses.  
In loose talk, “vague” and “ambiguous” are sometimes treated as synonyms 
or as different degrees of underdeterminacy.22  This Article will use the 
terms “vague” and “ambiguous” in their strict (or philosophical) senses23 
as articulated in the following definitions: 
Vagueness: A term or phrase is vague if and only if it admits 
of borderline (or uncertain) cases.24 
 
CONSTRUCTION 5 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 
LOYOLA L. REV. 611, 611–29 (1999).  Another important early adopter of this distinction 
(in the context of constitutional theory) was Robert Clinton.  See Robert N. Clinton, 
Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of ‘This Constitution’, 72 
IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1265 (1987).  For a brief introduction to the distinction, see Legal 
Theory Lexicon 063: Interpretation and Construction, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal 
_theory_lexicon/2008/04/legal-theory-le.html (Feb. 8, 2009). 
 21. See Posting of Lawrence B. Solum to Legal Theory Blog, http://lsolum. 
typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/10/semantic-and-no.html (Oct. 30, 2007, 12:30).  Cf. Lawrence 
B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 
473 (1987) (distinguishing determinacy, indeterminacy, and underdeterminacy). 
 22. Ambiguity is sometimes defined as having two senses: the first is “doubtful or 
uncertain” and the second is “capable of being understood in two or more possible 
senses.”  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/ambiguous.  
Vague is defined as unclear or imprecise. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www. 
m-w.com/dictionary/vague.  Neither ordinary usage nor the dictionary definitions capture the 
strict (or philosophical) senses of these terms. 
 23. See Legal Theory Lexicon 051: Vagueness and Ambiguity, http://lsolum. 
typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/08/legal_theory_le.html (Nov. 22, 2008). 
 24. A deeper account is offered in TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2000).  Endicott identifies two marks of vagueness: (1) borderline 
cases, (2) a tolerance principle, which states that “a tiny change in an object in a respect 
relevant to the application of the expression cannot make the difference between the 
expression's applying and not applying.” Id. at 31–33. 
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Ambiguity: A term or phrase is ambiguous in the strict or 
philosophical sense when it has more than one sense or meaning.25 
The term “tall” is vague in the strict sense.  Some people are definitely 
short—Danny DeVito.  Others definitely are tall—Shaquille O’Neal.  
But the term “tall” is vague.  5’11 is almost definitely tall for a woman in 
the United Sates, but it is probably a borderline case for men—Kurt 
Russell (in real life) is neither definitely tall nor definitely not tall.  
“Tall” is not the sort of quality for which there are definite criteria that 
sort the world into “tall” things and “not tall” things.  In other words, 
“tall” is vague.  “Cool,” on the other hand, is ambiguous, because it has 
one sense related to temperature, another sense related to excitement and 
emotion, and a third sense related to hipness and style.26  The same term 
or phrase can be both vague and ambiguous: for example, when “cool” 
is used to refer to temperature, it is vague, because there is no bright line 
between warm and cool. 
In sum, an originalist theory is a member of the family of theories of 
constitutional interpretation that claims: (1) that the linguistic meaning 
of each provision of the constitution was fixed at the time that provision 
was framed and ratified, and (2) that the original meaning constrains 
correct or legitimate constitutional practice.  Originalist theories include 
original intentions originalism and original public originalism, and these 
theories have been justified by a variety of arguments, including 
arguments that focus on popular sovereignty and the rule of law.  Many 
originalists distinguish constitutional interpretation (which recovers the 
linguistic meaning of the text and resolves ambiguity) from constitutional 
construction (which characteristically involves the determination of 
constitutional doctrines and practices that deal with underdeterminacies 
that result from the fact that many constitutional provisions are vague). 
B.  What is Incorporation? 
Articulating the implications of originalist theory for incorporation 
requires an understanding of “incorporation.”  There is a widely shared 
“rough and ready” understanding of incorporation—a provision of the 
Bill of Rights is “incorporated” if that provision is applied to the states; 
mutatis mutandus, such provisions are “not incorporated” if they are not 
 
 25. For discussions of ambiguity, see Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule 
and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the 
Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 178–87 (1995); Allan Farnsworth, “Dmeaning” in the Law 
of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 953–57 (1967); John T. Valauri, Confused Notions and 
Constitutional Theory, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 567, 570-73 (1985). 
 26. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/cool. 
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applied to the states.  But this rough and ready understanding is imprecise 
for at least two reasons.  First, incorporation does not necessarily involve 
the application of the semantic content of the first eight amendments to 
the Constitution to the states.  For example, the First Amendment begins 
“Congress shall make no law . . . ,” but the incorporation debates are not 
about the powers of Congress—they are about the application to the 
states of the substance of “establishment,” “free exercise,” “freedom of 
speech,” and so forth.27 The second reason that the rough and ready 
formulation is imprecise is related to the first reason.  Despite Barron v. 
Baltimore,28 the Bill of Rights has always applied to the states.  State 
courts have always been bound by limitations of federal power in the 
Bill of Rights.  State legislatures have never had the power to authorize 
Congress to infringe the freedom of speech; nor have state executives 
ever had the power to enforce federal laws that would violate the 
freedom of the press.  The first and second reason both establish that the 
incorporation debate is about application of the rights established by the 
doctrines of constitutional law that are associated with the Bill of Rights 
as limitations of state power that parallel the limitations these rights 
impose on the federal government. 
Both constitutional doctrine and theoretical debate about incorporation 
have followed a tortuous path—with many twists and turns.  In particular, 
one aspect of the debate concerns the extent to which incorporation is 
wholesale or selective.  Is the entirety of the Bill of Rights to be applied 
to the states?  Or are some provisions to be included (freedom of speech) 
and others omitted (the right to bear arms)?  Another twist concerns the 
content of the rights that are to be incorporated.  If the “freedom of 
speech” is incorporated, does this imply that the limitations on state 
power are “identical” (in a loose sense of “identical”) to the limitations 
on federal power imposed by the First Amendment?  Or does incorporation 
only require that some subset of these limitations be imposed on the 
states—perhaps the “core”? 
C.  Narrowing the Scope of Inquiry to Privileges or Immunities 
The general topic at hand is investigation of the implications of 
 
 27. Michael Kent Curtis articulates this point in terms of the distinction between 
rights and security devices.  See Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: 
An Overview From One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2009). 
 28. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833). 
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originalist theory for debates about incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
via the Fourteenth Amendment.  In theory such incorporation might be 
accomplished via “equal protection,” “due process,” or “privileges 
or immunities.”  And in practice, the focus of current constitutional doctrine 
has been on the due process clause.  For the purposes of this Article, 
however, discussion will focus on the privileges or immunities clause of 
Section One. 
This is only an assumption.  This Article does not claim that something 
like incorporation could not be justified by originalist interpretation of 
the due process clause or the equal protection clause.  Perhaps, “due 
process of law” implies that the “law” reflected in the Bill of Rights is 
“due,” or perhaps the rights established in the first eight amendments are 
components of “liberty” that the due process clause protects.  These 
possibilities will simply be set aside, and this Article will proceed on the 
assumption that the due process clause is limited to what we call 
“procedural due process.”  Likewise, it is possible that the phrase “equal 
protection of the laws” includes “protection by the rights established in 
the “laws” set forth in the Bill of Rights.”  Once again, I shall simply assume 
that the equal protection clause is either concerned with substantive 
equality (the conventional understanding embodied in modern doctrine) 
or with the equal enforcement of the legal rights of all persons (as an 
originalist might argue). 
Incorporation under the privileges or immunities clause might have 
important practical consequences.  The due process and equal protection 
clauses apply to all “persons” whereas the privileges or immunities 
clause applies only to “citizens of the United States.”  So, if the Supreme 
Court were to transfer the basis of incorporation to the latter clause, the 
structure of legal rights of noncitizens would be changed in various 
ways.  This practical question is surely important, but it will not receive 
further attention in this article.29 
If we set aside the due process and equal protection clauses, we are 
left with the privileges or immunities clause: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 
Thus, a first take on our question could be framed as follows: are the 
substantive rights (freedom of speech, free exercise, the right to keep 
and bear arms) set out in the Bill of Rights “privileges or immunities 
citizens of the United States” given the conventional semantic meaning 
of that phrase (or its constituent elements) at the time of the framing and 
 
 29. See Solum, supra note 1. 
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adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
D.  Roadmap 
With our question now defined, the remainder of this Article will 
proceed as follows.  Part II examines the theoretical framework for an 
investigation of incorporation that operates within the narrow confines 
of interpretation of the text based on the assumption that the original 
meaning of the text is solely determined by the public meaning for 
ordinary citizens at the time of framing and ratification.  Part III relaxes 
the assumption that “original meaning” is determined solely by the 
linguistic practices of the whole community and considers the possibility 
that the phrase “privileges or immunities” was a term of art with a 
technical meaning for those learned in the law.  Part IV relaxes the 
assumption that the incorporation debate must be resolved solely by 
interpretation and considers the possibility that incorporation doctrine 
might be viewed as a construction of an underdeterminate constitutional 
text.  Part V considers the implications of the possibility that the “privileges 
or immunities clause” instantiates what might be called a failure of 
constitutional communication.  Part VI concludes. 
II.  PUBLIC MEANING OF “THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS 
OF THE UNITED STATES” FOR ORDINARY CITIZENS 
This Article is about the relationship of originalist theory to the 
incorporation debate. The point of the Article is to pinpoint the 
theoretical assumptions that are implicit in various moves that are (or 
could be) made by those who advocate or oppose incorporation on 
originalist grounds.  In order to lay bare the theoretical bones, the 
assumptions of originalist theory will be articulated as carefully defined 
assumptions.  The aim is to isolate the effect of the various elements of 
(and options for) originalist theory.  That isolation begins with two 
assumptions—about “public meaning” and “interpretation.” 
A.  Two Assumptions 
This Part is predicated on two assumptions (which are relaxed in 
subsequent Parts of this Article): first, that original meaning is limited to 
public meaning for “ordinary citizens,” and second, that incorporation 
must be justified on the basis of interpretation without the aid of 
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construction.  Each of these assumptions requires further explanation. 
1.  Assumption One: “Original Meaning” Is Public                                
Meaning for Ordinary Citizens 
The first assumption is that “original meaning” should be understood 
as meaning for the public at large or for “ordinary citizens.”  This assumption 
is explicit in the following passage from the majority opinion in District 
of Columbia v. Heller: 
In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution 
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in 
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.”  United 
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731, 51 S.Ct. 220, 75 L.Ed. 640 (1931); see 
also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824).  Normal meaning 
may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical 
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding 
generation.30 
In this passage, Justice Scalia distinguishes between “idiomatic meaning” 
and “technical meanings.”  The notion of an idiom is based on the fact a 
phrase in a natural language such as English can have a meaning that is 
not identical to the meaning that would be derived from the individual 
words and the rules of grammar and syntax via the principle of 
compositionality.  A “nest egg” is not an egg in a nest.  Someone who 
“kicks the bucket” is dead—and most definitely not “alive and kicking.”  
Heller allows for the idiomatic meanings, but it rejects “technical 
meanings” “that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the 
founding generation.” 
Underlying this assumption are further assumptions about patterns of 
linguistic practice.  Ordinary citizens participate in a general community 
of language users.  Not every citizen knows the meaning of every word 
or phrase that has what Heller calls “normal meaning”—but for a 
meaning to be “normal” it must be widely dispersed culturally (among 
various social and occupational groups) and geographically in the 
relevant community (defined by the territory of the United States).31  
“Technical meanings” are shared by linguistic subgroups, e.g. lawyers, 
doctors, or seamen, whose linguistic communities have distinctive patterns 
of usage that are not shared by the general community of language users. 
For the purposes of this Part, we shall assume that the original 
 
 30. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008). 
 31. The explanation in text is not intended as an adequate theory of “normal 
meaning”: it is a gesture or “hand wave” in the direction of a more fully developed 
account.  “Normal meaning” is Justice Scalia’s term.  Scalia’s terminology plays no role 
in the theory I develop in Semantic Originalism, supra note 1. 
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meaning of the privileges or immunities clause is the conventional 
semantic meaning of the phrase “the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States” for the community of competent English speakers 
who occupied the territory of the United States. 
2.  Assumption Two: Incorporation Must Be Justified by                   
Interpretation Without the Aid of Construction 
Recall that the interpretation-construction distinction differentiates 
two distinct modes or moments in the application of the constitutional 
text to a particular case or controversy.  Constitutional interpretation discovers 
the linguistic meaning or semantic context of the text.  Constitutional 
construction translates that meaning into constitutional doctrines that are 
sufficiently determinate to resolve particular cases.  In some cases, 
construction is automatic—the constitutional text assigns two Senators 
to each state and this content of the corresponding rule of constitutional 
doctrine is identical to the linguistic meaning of the text in all but the 
most unusual circumstances.  But in other cases, the linguistic meaning 
may be vague.  For example, the phrases “legislative power,” “executive 
power,” and “judicial power” may have a core of determinate meaning 
but admit of borderline cases that require a rule of construction to 
resolve particular questions. 
For the purposes of this Part, we shall operate on the assumption that 
the question whether the privileges or immunities clause authorizes 
incorporation should be answered in the affirmative if and only if 
incorporation is required by constitutional interpretation—that is, by the 
linguistic meaning of the clause without supplementation by constitutional 
construction. 
B.  How Could Incorporation Be Justified as an Interpretation               
Based on “Public Meaning” for Ordinary Citizens? 
Much of the discussion surrounding incorporation and the privileges 
or immunities clause is framed in intentionalist terms.  Did the framers 
(or ratifiers) of the Fourteenth intend to incorporate the Bill of Rights?  
Was that their purpose?  Did they expect that incorporation would 
follow from adoptions of the Fourteenth?  Given the two assumptions 
that control the discussion in this Part, the answers to those questions 
can only provide indirect evidence that bears on the main question—
what was the conventional semantic meaning (or “normal meaning”) of 
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the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” for 
ordinary citizens? 
To begin, it is obvious that the privileges or immunities clause does 
not directly and unambiguously state that the states may not violate the 
rights of citizens that are contained in the Bill of Rights.  That could 
have been said in various ways.  Each provision of the Bill of Rights 
could have been repeated with an appropriate adjustment: for example, 
“No state shall violate the free exercise of religion or infringe the freedom 
of speech.”  Or the clause could have read, “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States as defined by the first eight amendments to 
this Constitution.” 
Nonetheless, it has been argued that the privileges and immunities 
clause should be read as having semantic content that is functionally 
equivalent to a direct and unambiguous statement of incorporation.  
Consider the following passage from Michael Kent Curtis’s Article for 
this conference: 
   According to Felix Frankfurter (concurring in Adamson v. California and 
citing Justice Holmes), “an amendment to the Constitution should be read in a 
‘sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adoption. . . . 
For it was for public adoption that it was proposed.’” What follows is a 
common, natural, and direct reading of the privileges or immunities clause: 
   No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge [reduce in 
scope or diminish] the privileges [rights] or immunities of [shared by and 
secured to] citizens of the United States. 
   Of course, the security was incomplete, as Barron v. Baltimore established.  That 
is why the additional “no state shall” security was needed.  One logical place to 
look for rights of citizens of the United States would be the rights set out in the 
Constitution.  The major group of rights listed is those liberties in the Bill of 
Rights.  There are a number of others such as habeas corpus.  Does the Bill of 
Rights contain rights?  We do describe it as a “Bill of Rights.” The rights are 
declared to exist, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly.  However, as the 
Supreme Court ruled in Barron, the rights are secured only against federal 
invasion.32 
The key premise in Curtis’s argument is that the words “privilege” and 
“immunity” were used as synonyms for the words “right” and “liberty,” 
and that the rights conferred in the Bill of Rights were described as 
“privileges” and “immunities” in ordinary usage in the periods before, during, 
and after the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Much of the evidence is provided in other work by Curtis that is cited in 
his paper for this conference.33 
 
 32. Curtis, supra note 27. 
 33. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life after 
Death: The Privileges or Immunities Of Citizens Of The United States, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 
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Let us assume that Curtis is right about linguistic practice in the 
relevant period, and that the rights conferred by the Bill of Rights would 
have been understood as “privileges” and “immunities” as well as “rights” 
and “liberties.”  (For the record, let me state that based on my reading of 
Curtis and other secondary literature, but not the original sources, I am 
provisionally persuaded by Curtis on this point.)  Would this make the 
case for incorporation given the two assumptions (public meaning only 
and interpretation solely)?  That question takes us to the problems of 
exclusion and inclusion. 
C.  The Problems of Exclusion and Inclusion 
If we assume that the phrase “privileges or immunities” is the 
equivalent of “rights or liberties” or more simply “rights,” does this 
imply that the privilege or immunities clause incorporates the “rights” in 
the Bill of Rights?  The problem with answering this question is that we 
need first to solve problems of exclusion and inclusion—what rights are 
included and what rights are excluded.  The semantic content of the clause 
is sufficient, by itself, to support the conclusion that at least some rights 
must be included—otherwise the clause would be without legal effect.  
One possible reading of the clause is that “all rights” are protected—this 
might flow from the use of the definite article “the” preceding “privileges or 
immunities.”  The use of the definite article “the” and the preposition “of” 
may imply that the rule of inclusion is existence—all rights that citizens 
have are included: the corresponding rule of exclusion is nonexistence—
rights that citizens do not possess are excluded.34 
But this immediately leads to another question, what kind of rights?  
This question will quickly lead us into deep waters and myriad possibilities.  
On this occasion, I will evade my responsibility for “doing the right 
thing” by investigating all of the possibilities and their merits and instead I 
shall merely assume that there are only three relevant possibilities.  The 
concept of right is ambiguous as between two kinds: legal rights (the 
rights conferred by law) and moral rights (the rights that citizens have a 
 
1071, 1091 (2000).  This article is essential reading for anyone researching the original 
meaning of the privileges or immunities clause. 
 34. The definite article “the” implies that the thing referred to is a particular thing: 
the function of the definite article is to particularize.  So the phrase “the privileges or 
immunities” has a different meaning than would the phrase “some privileges or immunities” 
or the phrase “a privilege or immunity.” 
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matter of political morality—alternatively we could use the terminology 
“natural rights”).  Thus, “privileges” or “immunities” might refer to: 
(1) legal rights only, (2) moral rights only, or (3) both moral and legal 
rights. 
For the moment, let us assume (as Curtis seems to assume) that the 
Fourteenth Amendment refers only to legal rights.  (Notice that this 
assumption leaves open the possibilities that legal rights are justified by 
reference to moral rights or that the two categories are extensionally 
equivalent or nearly equivalent.)  The assumption that privileges or 
immunities are legal rights then yields the conclusion that the privileges 
or immunities clause encompasses all of the legal rights that citizens 
actually possess, including but not limited to the rights contained in the 
Bill of Rights. 
That conclusion would be troubling for obvious reasons.  It would 
entail the conclusion that the privileges or immunities clause conferred 
constitutional status (as against the states) on all the legal rights 
possessed by citizens, including for example, all of the rights under state 
law including the provisions of contracts, wills, trusts, and so forth.  
There is much more to be said about this possibility, but at this point we 
can merely observe that this interpretation of the privileges or 
immunities clause is very broad and might even count as “absurd”—
although much would need to be said to show that was so. 
If moral rights were included, the implications would be even more 
disturbing.  If all moral rights were protected by the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, then the Fourteenth Amendment would prevent the 
states from doing anything that violated any justified moral claim of any 
citizen.  Because lawmaking is state action, the implication is that every 
state law would be subject to a “morality” test—federalizing the regulation 
of almost every aspect of human conduct. 
D.  The Meaning of “Of” 
But there is more text!  The relevant phrase is “privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.”  What does it mean for a 
right to be a right of citizens of the United States?  There are at least 
three possibilities—although there may be more. 
1.  Privileges or Immunities that Any Citizen of the United States 
Happens to Possess: The All-rights Interpretation 
The first possibility is that the word “of” limits “privileges or 
immunities” to those rights that any citizen of the United States happens 
to possess.  In the immediately prior section, we discussed the problems 
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that this reading creates.  Because it results in the constitutionalization of 
all legal rights possessed by any citizen of the United States, any time 
any state acted in a way that modified or extinguished a legal and/or 
moral right, there would potentially be a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  This reading seems implausible. 
2.  Privileges or Immunities that Citizens Possess by Virtue of the 
National Citizenship: The In-Virtue-Of Interpretation 
A second possibility is that for a right to be a privilege or immunity of 
citizens of the United States, the right must be a right that the citizen 
possesses qua (or in virtue of) United States Citizenship.  That is, the 
right must be a right that the person does possess because the person is a 
citizen and that the person would not possess if the person were not a 
citizen.  Rights that are limited to citizens would be included, and rights 
that are not limited to citizens would not be included.  This rule would 
result in the exclusion of a variety of rights conferred by state and 
federal law on citizens and noncitizens alike.  For example, it would 
exclude various common law rights and rights created by contracts, 
trusts, and the like.  It would also exclude a variety of statutory rights, 
both state and federal—such as the rights conferred by copyright, patent, 
and trademark statutes (because these rights do not depend on one’s 
status as a citizen). 
How would this principle operate with respect to the Bill of Rights?  
Some of the rights that are included in the Bill of Rights may be limited 
to United States Citizens.  For example, the Second Amendment recognizes 
“the right of the people to keep and bear arms,” and arguably “the 
people” refers to citizenry rather than all persons: a similar observation 
could be made about the right of assembly in the First Amendment.  But 
other provisions of the Bill of Rights are not limited in this way.  The Third 
Amendment extends protection to “owners” and the Fifth Amendment to 
“persons.”  The Sixth Amendment applies to the “accused,” and the Seventh 
and Eighth Amendments do not limit their coverage to “citizens.”  Moreover, 
neither the word “citizen” nor the phrase “citizens of the United States” 
appears in the Bill of Rights. 
I should now state the obvious.  Limiting privileges or immunities to 
those rights that are possessed by citizens of the United States qua their 
status as national citizens results in an extremely narrow set of privileges 
or immunities.  Indeed, a variation of this reading was adopted in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases—which are sometimes characterized as judicial 
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nullification of the privileges or immunities clause. 
3.  Privileges or Immunities that are Shared by Citizens of the United 
States: The Shared-Rights Interpretation 
There is, however, a third interpretation of the phrase “of citizens of 
the United States.”  Recall that we are assuming that the relevant rights 
are legal rights.  The locution “privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States” might have been understood as referring to those rights 
that are shared by citizens of the United States.  Thus, “No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge any privilege or immunity 
of a citizen of the United States” might have a different meaning than 
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”  The former 
expression could refer to the set of rights that results from adding the 
sets of legal rights that attach to each and every individual citizen.  The 
later expression could refer to the set of rights that results from 
identifying the common members of the sets of legal rights that belong 
to individual citizens. 
On the shared rights interpretation, the set of privileges or immunities 
is large, but it falls far short of all legal rights.  For example, the right to 
own property and make contracts might have been shared by all citizens 
of the United States, but the right of particular persons in particular 
property or the rights conferred by a particular contract would not be 
shared.  A core set of common law rights would have been shared by 
all35 citizens, but to the extent that state law differed on the details of 
contract, tort, or property law, the zone of variation would be outside the 
set of shared rights. 
The shared rights interpretation would seem to sanction incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights: all of the substantive rights protected by the Bill of 
Rights were shared by citizens of the United States. 
4.  Resolving the Ambiguity Regarding the Meaning of “Of” 
Can the ambiguity regarding the meaning of “of” be resolved by 
original public meaning originalism—given the two assumptions (meaning 
to ordinary citizens only and interpretation solely)?  That is surely a 
difficult question, and it is not the purpose of this Article to answer such 
questions.  Theoretically, the method of approach would begin with an 
 
 35. “All” should probably be read as “almost” all, or perhaps “all” adult citizens 
who do not suffer from a legal disability, such as mental incapacity or conviction of a 
crime that results in a loss of rights otherwise available to adult competent citizens. 
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investigation of linguistic practice.  For example, it might be the case 
that the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” 
had acquired a quasi-idiomatic meaning: one of the three senses 
(“possessed by any,” “in virtue of,” or “shared by all”) might be the 
standard meaning of the phrase.  (This possibility seems very unlikely to 
me.)  Or it might be the case that linguistic practice in the eighteenth 
century ruled out one of the possible senses identified here.  (Again, this 
seems unlikely to me, but this is idle speculation without an examination 
of a massive amount of evidence.) 
Originalist theory might allow for another route to the resolution of the 
ambiguity.  Frequently, ambiguities in the linguistic meaning or semantic 
content of an utterance can be resolved by examining the context of 
utterance.  In a given context, it may be clear that one of the possible 
senses of an utterance could not have been the sense in which the phrase 
would have been understood by competent speakers of English.  That is, 
some senses of an ambiguous expression may become “absurd” in 
context.  Given the theoretical commitments of original public meaning 
originalism, the relevant context would be what I have called “the 
publicly available context of constitutional utterance”—those features of 
the context of framing and ratification that would have been known to 
public at large at time of origin.  Thus, if the constitutionalization of all 
legal rights would have been viewed as absurd, that reading of “of” 
might be ruled out.  For example, the first sense of “of” identified above, 
the all-rights interpretation, might well have been considered absurd.  
Given the disagreement over the Slaughterhouse Cases, however, it may 
well be the case that neither the “in virtue of” nor the “shared by all” 
senses would have been viewed as absurd. 
What does originalist theory prescribe in this situation?  Again, the 
issue is complex and an adequate analysis would require an extended 
investigation.  I believe that in the end, there are cases of what might be 
called “irreducible ambiguity.”  That is, there are cases when the original 
public meaning of a constitutional provision is ambiguous—even after 
the publicly available context of constitutional utterance is taken into 
account.  As is the case with vagueness, this kind of ambiguity is not 
tantamount to indeterminacy.  Originalist method might narrow the 
possibilities without fully resolving the question.  At this point, the discovery 
of linguistic meaning has done all the work it can do.  Interpretation 
exits the stage, and something else, constitutional construction, makes its 
entrance. 
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If it were the case that the ambiguity between “in virtue of” and 
“shared by all” could not be resolved by interpretation, then our answer 
to the main question of this Part would be “negative.”  Given an ambiguity 
that cannot be resolved by interpretation and the assumption that 
interpretation must do all the work, originalist theory would suggest 
that the incorporation question is “undecidable”36 in something like the 
formal sense of that term.  Given our two assumptions (public meaning 
only and interpretation solely), incorporation could not be justified on 
originalist grounds. 
E.  The Assumptions Revisited 
But what if we were to relax one or both of these assumptions?  In the 
next Part of this Article, we shall examine the possibility that “public 
meaning originalism” could allow for technical meanings or terms of art.  
In the following Part, we shall consider the implications of constitutional 
construction for circumstances in which the linguistic meaning of the 
text is vague or irreducibly ambiguous. 
III.  “PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES” AS A TERM OF ART 
The phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” 
might have been understood as “common parlance”—as having a 
meaning that is determined by the shared linguistic conventions of the 
linguistic community of speakers of American English in the mid-
Nineteenth Century.  But what if this were not the case?  What if  “privileges” 
and “immunities”37 were terms of art, with a technical meaning that 
 
 36. See Undecidable, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable. 
 37. It is possible that the larger phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States” had idiomatic or technical meaning as a whole phrase.  Whether or not 
this was the case depends on the evidence, but there is evidence of usage of the whole 
phrase.  For example, in Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445, 451–52 (1805), 
lawyers for residents of the District of Colmbia argued: “It is true that the citizens of 
Columbia are not entitled to the elective franchise in as full a manner as the citizens of 
states. They have no vote in the choice of president, vice president, senators and 
representatives in congress. . . . But in every other respect the citizens of Columbia are 
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  And in 
1835, Benjamin Butler, the Attorney General under Andrew Jackson, responded to 
efforts in Arkansas to organize proceedings to seek statehood: 
   No law has yet been passed by Congress which either expressly or impliedly 
gives to the people of Arkansas the authority to form a State government. . . . 
But I am not prepared to say that all proceedings on this subject on the part of 
the citizens of Arkansas will be illegal. They undoubtedly possess the ordinary 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Among these is the 
right of the people "peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for the 
redress of grievances." In the exercise of this right, the inhabitants of Arkansas 
may peaceably meet together in primary assemblies, or conventions chosen by 
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would have been fully grasped by a linguistic subgroup (those learned in 
the law), but not fully understood by ordinary citizens?  This Part 
addresses these questions in three stages: first, by considering the 
significance of technical meanings as a matter of originalist theory; 
second, by examining two candidates for the technical meaning of 
“privileges or immunities”; and third, by examining the implications of a 
technical meaning for the incorporation debate. 
A.  The Division of Linguistic Labor 
How can originalists respond to the problem of constitutional terms of 
art—the use of “technical meanings”? How can “original public meaning 
originalism” embrace the idea that some of the provisions of the 
constitution might not have had “public meanings”?  In approaching this 
question, it is important to recall that originalism is committed to 
recovery of the originalist linguistic meaning of the constitutional 
text.  Linguistic meanings are determined by linguistic facts—and not 
by normative theories.  The determination whether a given constitutional 
provision employed a technical meaning or term of art does not depend 
on our views of popular sovereignty or our beliefs about constitutional 
legitimacy.  For example, if the phrase “letters of marquee and reprisal” 
was a term of art in late Eighteenth Century linguistic practice, then the 
semantic content of that phrase is given by its technical meaning—even 
if our beliefs about popular sovereignty lead us the conclusion that it 
 
such assemblies, for the purpose of petitioning Congress to abrogate the 
Territorial government, and to admit them into the Union as an independent state. 
Right of the Territories to Become States, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 726, 732–33 (1835).  And 
President Jackson himself also used the whole phrase: 
   In the organization of the present temporary government, and its execution, I 
have steadily in few the securing to the inhabitants of the Floridas all the 
privileges and immunities guaranteed to them by the treaty. 
   The principle of these is the protection of their persons, property, and religion, 
until they shall be incorporated into the union, and become entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. 
PHILO ASHLEY GOODWIN, BIOGRAPHY OF ANDREW JACKSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FORMERLY MAJOR GENERAL IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES 257 (1835), 
available at http://www.google.com/books?id=nHkEAAAAYAAJ. 
In this Article, the aim is not to resolve this question, but rather to elucidate its 
theoretical dimension.  If the whole phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States” had an idiomatic or technical meaning at the time the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, then that meaning would be the relevant original public 
meaning for the purposes of originalist theory. 
INCORPORATIONANDORIGINALISTTHEORY.DOC 1/20/10  12:36 PM 
 
430 
would have been preferable for the framers to have employed a 
nontechnical term. 
The solution to the problem of technical meanings is to recognize a 
division of linguistic labor.38  The intuitive idea is simple.  When members 
of the general public encounter a constitutional term of art, their 
understanding of its meaning can be described as involving a process of 
deferral.  Consider the following example.  An ordinary citizen reads the 
phrase “letters of marquee and reprisal,” and thinks, “Hmm.  I wonder 
what that means.  It sounds like technical legal language to me.  If I want 
to know what it means, I should probably ask a lawyer or maybe a 
judge.”  That is, ordinary citizens would recognize a division of linguistic 
labor and defer to the understanding of the term of art that would be the 
publicly available meaning to those who were members of the relevant 
group and those who shared the understandings of the members of the 
relevant group. Blackstone put it this way: terms of art “must be taken 
according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, and 
science.”39 
The technical meaning is (in a special sense) still a “public meaning.”  
Given the division of linguistic labor, it is possible for ordinary citizens 
to recognize the meaningfulness of a term of art—even though they 
cannot themselves articulate even an approximate version of the criteria 
for correct application of the term.  For example, we might say that the 
term “quark” has a public meaning, roughly “some sort of elementary 
particle that is defined by physics,” even though very few members of 
the public could give a rough paraphrase of the definition or distinguish 
quarks from neutrinos.40 
This solution to the problem of technical meanings requires either that 
each constitutional term of art refer us to a single group, or to a group of 
groups that share the same understanding of the term of art.  For example, if 
both sailors and lawyers shared the same understanding of “letters of 
marquee and reprisal” then constitutional communication could succeed.  
If different groups had different understandings of the same phrase, 
constitutional communication could still succeed, assuming the publicly 
 
 38. The idea of a division of linguistic labor is usually attributed to Hilary Putnam. 
See Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of 'Meaning' in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOL. 2: MIND, 
LANGUAGE AND REALITY 227 (1985); see also Robert Ware, The Division of Linguistic 
Labor and Speaker Competence, 34 PHIL. STUD. 37, 37 (1978); Mark Greenberg, 
Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and the Content of Thought (UCLA Sch. of Law 
Research Paper No. 07-30), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030144. 
 39. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *59 (W.S. 
Hein & Co. reprint 1992) (1768). 
 40. Compare Quark, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quark with Neutrino, 
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutrino. 
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available context of constitutional utterance allowed resolution of the 
resulting ambiguity.  For example, if the publicly available context of 
constitutional utterance made it clear that the relevant sense of “letters of 
marquee and reprisal” was the legal sense, then the linguistic practices of 
lawyers (and not of sailors) would determine the relevant meaning of the 
term. 
At this point, it might be argued that allowing for constitutional terms 
of art is inconsistent with popular sovereignty as a normative justification 
for originalism.  Full consideration of that argument is itself a large topic 
deserving of extended treatment, but on this occasion I can only offer a few 
brief remarks. 
First, it is not clear that the deployment of constitutional terms of art is 
inconsistent with popular sovereignty.  Reconciliation might occur 
via several routes.  For example, it might be argued that democratic 
legitimacy requires only that the term of art be publicly accessible 
through reasonable effort.  Most participants in the ratification process 
might rely on the fact that a few participants have ascertained that the 
technical meaning did not conceal a secret meaning that would not have 
survived full public disclosure: this seems especially plausible with 
respect to complex provisions with limited effects.  Or it might be 
argued that the Constitution as a whole can retain democratic legitimacy 
even if there are particular provisions that lack public meanings. 
Second, it is not clear that popular sovereignty theory provides the 
best or only justification for originalism.  It might be the case that 
adherence to original meaning is justified by rule of law concerns—even 
if an important constitutional provision were undemocratic because of its 
use of technical language.  Third, even if popular sovereignty theory 
warranted the judicial nullification of the original linguistic meaning of a 
technical term in the Constitution, it might nonetheless be important to 
understand what meaning was being rejected.  The actual linguistic meaning 
of the provision might, for example, be relevant to the construction of an 
artificial “public meaning” for the purposes of articulating constitutional 
doctrine. 
B.  “Privileges or Immunities” as a Term of Art 
Once again, this Article makes no claims about the original meaning 
of the privileges or immunities clause.  On this occasion, the aim is 
simply to explicate the implications of originalist theory for such claims.  
Nonetheless, it may be helpful to examine some of the possible 
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“technical meanings” in order to make the explication of abstract theory 
both clearer and more determinant. 
1.  Corfield v. Coryell 
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a 
variety of references of Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion in 
Corfield v. Coryell,41 a Circuit Court opinion interpreting the privileges 
and immunities clause of Article IV.  That clause provides: 
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.42 
Corfield offered the following gloss on the meaning of the phrase 
“privileges and immunities”: 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states?  We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges 
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, 
to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been 
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the 
time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.  What these fundamental 
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate.  
They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: 
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to 
acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness 
and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly 
prescribe for the general good of the whole.  The right of a citizen of one state 
to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, 
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas 
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to 
take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption 
from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; 
may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of 
citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges 
deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as 
regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to 
be exercised.43 
This passage suggests that the “privileges and immunities” of Article IV 
are a subset of the general class of all privileges and immunities—those 
which are “fundamental,” “belong of right to the citizens of all free 
governments,” and “have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of 
the several states.” It then offers a list of particular rights that are 
included in the list. 
From the perspective of originalist theory, it is not clear what is going 
 
 41. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
 42. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 43. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551. 
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on in Corfield.  There opinion does not define the relevant terms 
(“privilege” and “immunity”).  Instead, it assumes that the phrase “privileges 
and immunities” is understood, and then suggests that the relevant subset 
contains only those privileges and immunities that are “in their nature 
fundamental.”  This move might be justified on the ground that only the 
fundamental privileges and immunities are privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states.  Or this might be considered a narrowing 
construction of a constitutional provision that otherwise would be 
impracticably broad.  But whatever the rationale of Corfield, it might be 
argued that the Corfield gloss established a technical meaning for the 
phrase “privileges and immunities” that would have been recognized as 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment “privileges or immunities” 
clause by those learned in the law at the time of its framing and 
ratification. 
Something more needs to be said about the possibility that Corfield 
established a technical legal meaning for “privileges” and “immunities.”  
To simplify, we can imagine a four-stage sequence by which the phrase 
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” acquired its 
“original linguistic meaning.”  At stage one, we have the conventional 
semantic meaning of the “privileges and immunities” clause of Article 
IV.  This meaning is simply the meaning of the individual words and 
phrases as combined by the rules of grammar and syntax at the time the 
original constitution was framed and ratified.  At stage two, the “privileges 
or immunities clause” of Article IV is given an authoritative construction 
by the Supreme Court in Corfield.  At stage three, that authoritative 
construction is absorbed by the linguistic subcommunity that consists of 
those learned in the law (lawyers, judges, and others), resulting in the 
words “privilege” and “immunity” acquiring a new technical meaning in 
legal discourse.  At stage four, that technical meaning is assumed in the 
framing, ratification, and subsequent interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The result is that the terms “privilege” and “immunity” had 
one linguistic meaning at the time Article IV was framed and ratified, and a 
different, but related meaning at the time the same words were used in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
On this view, the terms “privileges” and “immunities” when used 
in appropriate contexts—including discussions of constitutional law—
would be terms of legal art or more particularly terms of art in American 
constitutional law.  Ordinary citizens might not be able to produce 
anything like the Corfield gloss if asked for the meaning of the phrase, 
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but they might recognize that technical language was being employed.  
On this view, “privileges” and “immunities” are like “quarks”: ordinary 
citizens may not be able to define them, but they recognize that they 
have technical meanings that are understood by experts. 
2.  Blackstone 
There are other indications that the words “privileges” and “immunities” 
might have had technical meanings, even before the words were used in 
Article IV.  In his Commentaries, Blackstone used the terms “privilege” 
and “immunity” as terns of art in the theory of the common law: 
   Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liberties.  The rights themselves 
thus defined by [Magna Carta and other foundational] statutes, consist in a 
number of private immunities; which will appear, from what has been premised, 
to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not 
required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else 
those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the 
natural liberties so given up by individuals.  These therefore were formerly, by 
inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind; but, in most other countries 
of the world being now more or less debased and destroyed, they at present may 
be said to remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the rights of the people 
of England.  And these may be reduced to three principal or primary articles; 
the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty; and the right of 
private property: because as there is no other known method of compulsion, or 
of abridging man’s natural free will, but by an infringement or diminution of 
one or other of these important rights, the preservation of these, inviolate, may 
justly be said to include the preservation of our civil immunities in their 
largest and most extensive sense.44 
Blackstone used the term “immunities” to describe what we would call 
“natural rights” or “rights of political morality.”  His concept of “privileges” 
or “civil privileges” corresponds to the modern notion of a legal right. 
Blackstone’s Commentaries and various American editions thereof 
certainly constituted part of the technical knowledge of those learned in 
the law in the Nineteenth Century.  It might be argued that Blackstone’s 
usage—equating immunities with natural rights and privileges with legal 
rights that substituted for (or protected) natural rights—either created or 
was evidence of common law terms of art that provided the relevant 
technical sense for these terms in Article IV and subsequently the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although Bushrod Washington’s formulation in Corfield v. Coryell is 
not identical to Blackstone’s, it is possible that these definitions can be 
 
 44. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *128–29 (emphasis added); see also Eric R. 
Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or Immunities of United States 
Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegen, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 777, 781–82, 784 
(2008). 
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reconciled.  Corfield doesn’t define “privilege” or “immunity”—it assumes 
some prior or already understood definition or usage.  The use of 
“fundamental” in Corfield could be reconciled with the notion of “natural 
liberty” in Blackstone.  Corfield’s list of privileges or immunities begins 
with “Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, 
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind” which seems 
to echo Blackstone’s three categories: “the right of personal security, the 
right of personal liberty; and the right of private property.” 
C.  The Implications for Incorporation 
Assuming arguendo that the “privileges or immunities” clause had a 
technical meaning along the lines suggested by Blackstone and/or 
Corfield, what would be the implications for the incorporation debates?  
The most obvious implication is that the specific list of rights contained 
in the Bill of Rights would have no special per se status as privileges or 
immunities.  That is not to say that these rights would not qualify as “natural 
liberties” or as “fundamental.”  But it would suggest that inclusion in the 
Bill of Rights would not automatically qualify a given right as a privilege or 
immunity of citizens of the United States.  Inclusion of a right in the Bill 
of Rights might, however, be relevant (epistemically) to the inquiry as to 
whether the right was “fundamental” or a “civil privilege” that protected an 
underlying “natural liberty.”  The fact that the framers of the Bill of Rights 
included a particular right in the Bill of Rights is evidence that they 
considered the right to be fundamental, and their opinions about this 
matter might affect our deliberations.  At a minimum, the inclusion of a 
right in the Bill of Rights might create a presumption (even if it were 
only a “bursting bubble”) in favor of inclusion of the right.  At a maximum, 
we might accord the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
epistemic authority over this question, concluding that our deliberations 
about the question whether these rights were truly fundamental would be 
more likely to issue in correct outcomes if we deferred to their opinions. 
Of course, it would not follow from this that the Bill of Rights would 
constitute an exhaustive list of the “privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States.”  Other rights might be included as well—including 
general rights to acquire, own, and alienate private property, to form and 
enforce contracts, to the protection of the state against violence, to self-
defense, and so forth.  Further complications become apparent at this stage 
of the analysis.  Suppose, for example, that the technical meaning of 
immunity was “natural right” and of privilege “a legal right that protects or 
INCORPORATIONANDORIGINALISTTHEORY.DOC 1/20/10  12:36 PM 
 
436 
substitutes for a natural right.”  What then are “natural rights” (or “natural 
liberties” to use Blackstone’s phrase)?  What are the implications for 
originalist theory if we believe that Eighteenth Century understandings 
of natural or fundamental rights were in error?  Or what if we conclude 
that the idea of a “natural right” is simply a mistake—that there are no 
real or actual entities that correspond to the eighteenth century 
conception of a natural right?  Should judges then resort to a “saving” or 
“mending” construction of the relevant provision?  Some of these 
questions will be discussed in Part V below, but at this stage, we return 
to the assumption made in Part II above, that the question of incorporation 
must be addressed by constitutional interpretation without the aid of 
constructions. 
IV.  CONSTRUCTION OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
In Part II, we assumed (for the purposes of clarity and precision in 
exposition) that the implications of originalist theory for incorporation 
could be addressed solely as a matter of constitutional interpretation.  
That is, we assumed that the relevant question was whether the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional text either required or forbade incorporation.  
Although that assumption is useful for the purpose of this Article—
exploration of the interaction of incorporation with originalist theory—it 
may obscure rather than illuminate the substance of the incorporation 
debate.  This would be the case, for example, if the text underdetermines 
the answer to the question whether the rights enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights are among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.  In this Part, we investigate the implications of constitutional 
construction for the question whether the privileges and immunities clause 
supports incorporations. 
We can begin by revisiting the interpretation-construction distinction, 
and then proceed to consider its implications for incorporation. 
A.  The Interpretation-Construction Distinction Revisited 
What is the difference between “constitutional interpretation” and 
“constitutional construction?”45  Absent a thorough familiarity with the 
history of the law of contracts, trusts, or wills, or a deep knowledge of 
contemporary constitutional theory, some readers may assume that these 
 
 45. See generally Mark K. Glasser & Keith A. Rowley, On Parol: The Construction 
and Interpretation of Written Agreements and the Role of Extrinsic Evidence in Contract 
Litigation, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 657, 661–63 (1997); Note, Choice of Law Rules for the 
Construction and Interpretation of Written Instruments, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1155–
56 (1959). 
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two terms are synonyms.  Many authors use “interpretation” and 
“construction” more or less interchangeably.46  In fact, the distinction 
between interpretation of the linguistic meaning of legal texts and the 
construction of legal rules from that linguistic meaning has a long 
history in Anglo-American law.47  Elaborating on the very tentative 
formulation offered above,48 we might use the following definitions: 
Interpretation: The activity of determining the linguistic meaning— 
or semantic content—of a legal text. 
Construction: The activity of translating the semantic content 
of a legal text into legal rules, paradigmatically in cases where the 
meaning of the text is vague. 
We interpret the meaning of a text, and then we construct legal rules to 
help us apply that linguistic meaning to particular fact situations. 
Courts and legal theorists have deployed the distinction between 
interpretation and construction in a variety of legal contexts, including 
contract law.  In a contracts case, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court 
stated, “Interpretation involves ascertaining the meaning of contractual 
words; construction refers to deciding their legal effect.”49 
We have already noted the connection between the interpretation-
construction distinction and the vagueness-ambiguity distinction.  
Characteristically, interpretation resolves ambiguity and construction 
creates subsidiary rules that resolve vagueness.  In most cases, interpretation 
resolves ambiguity because usually there is a linguistic fact of the matter 
about the semantic meaning of a text given the context of utterance: 
words that are ambiguous without context usually become unambiguous 
once the context of utterance is considered.  This fact is a simple 
 
 46. See, e.g., Michael W. Mullane, Statutory Interpretation in Arkansas: How 
Should a Statute be Read? When is it Subject to Interpretation? What our Courts Say 
and What they Do, 2004 ARK. L. NOTES 85, 89 n.22 (2004) (““Interpretation” and 
“construction” will be treated as synonyms in this paper.”); BRYAN A. GARNER, A 
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE, 462 (2nd Ed. 1995); Gary E. O'Connor, 
Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 333, 335 
n.5 (2004) (“This article treats the terms “statutory interpretation” and “statutory 
construction” as interchangeable synonyms.”). 
 47. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 11, 44 (1880), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=tE4uAAAAIAAJ&printsec=titlepage&dq=lieber+legal 
+hermeneutics. 
 48. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
 49. Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Inv. Corp., 266 N.W. 2d 22, 25 (Iowa 
1978). 
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consequence of the ability of humans to communicate effectively: most 
of the time speakers and writers aim at avoiding irresolvable ambiguity 
and listeners and readers are skilled at deciphering ambiguities by attending 
to contextual clues. 
The relationship between ambiguity, context, and interpretation can be 
clarified by examples.  Consider once again the ambiguous word “cool.” 
In the context, “That refrigerator is running very cool—let’s check the 
thermostat,” the ambiguity disappears.  Likewise, if someone says, “Miles 
Davis was a pioneer of cool jazz,” we know that the intended sense is 
not temperature related.  This same point can be illustrated with examples 
from constitutional law.  For example, the phrase “United States” in the 
United States Constitution refers to the nation composed of fifty states in 
North American and various territories; it does not refer to other political 
entities that have been called the United States, such as the United States 
of Belgium, the United States of Mexico or the United States of Brazil. 
Characteristically, interpretation resolves ambiguity, but in the usual 
case, construction resolves vagueness.  Interpretation is inapt as a method 
for resolving vagueness, because interpretation (the determination of 
linguistic meaning or semantic content) cannot do the required work.  
When a word or phrase has a linguistic meaning that is vague, then 
interpretation runs out.  If the linguistic meaning is vague, then vagueness 
is the result of interpretation and not a problem to be solved by interpretation.  
When interpretation exits the stage, then construction makes its entrance.  
Construction allows us to draw a line—making the vague provision more 
specific—or gives us a decision procedure, such as a procedure that allows 
case-by-case resolution of the vagueness. 
In the discussion that follows, we will investigate the possibility that 
the constitutional decision whether to incorporate the Bill of Rights via 
the privileges or immunities clause must or should be made via a process 
of constitutional construction. 
B.  Incorporation and Vagueness 
Is the privileges or immunities clause vague?  On some readings of the 
clause, it may be.  For example, if the meaning of “of” is “shared by 
citizens” then there may be borderline cases—rights that are recognized 
by almost all of the states and therefore are shared by most but not all 
citizens: it might be the case that most but not all states required 
indictment by a grand jury at the time the privileges or immunities 
clause was adopted.  The Fifth Amendment’s command that “No person 
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,” might serve as the basis 
for a construction of “privileges or immunities” that included the right. 
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Similarly, if “privileges or immunities” were “fundamental” rights or 
“natural liberties,” there might be borderline cases—rights for which the 
question whether they are fundamental vel non has no determinate 
answer.  If this were the case, then construction would be required.  We 
might adopt a rule of construction that afforded decisive weight to the 
fact that that a right was included in the Bill of Rights.  For example, it 
might be argued that the right against self-incrimination is not clearly 
fundamental, but that as a matter of constitutional construction, it should 
be counted as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States. 
There is another way in which the privileges or immunities clause 
might be vague.  Even if it is clear that a particular abstract right is a 
privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States, that abstract right 
may itself be vague.  For example, suppose that freedom of speech is 
clearly one of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.  Nonetheless, the question whether a particular state law violates 
the freedom of speech may itself involve a borderline case that could 
reasonably be resolved either way.  Constitutional doctrine might resolve 
these borderline cases one way if the actor was the federal government 
and another way if the alleged violator was a state or local government.  
But this has not been the usual rule of constitutional doctrine (in the 
current doctrinal environment in which incorporation is accomplished 
via the due process clause).  Under the regime of selective incorporation, 
some but not all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are applied to the 
states, but once a provision is “incorporated” then all of the applicable 
rules of federal constitutional doctrine are applied as well.  This result 
would be remarkably difficult to justify as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation: the specific contours of first amendment doctrine are even 
less plausibly attributed to the privileges or immunities clause than they 
are to the First Amendment itself.  But this rule might make eminent 
sense as a rule of constitutional construction—for a variety of reasons.50 
 
 50. We can imagine several reasons for incorporating the details of federal Bill-of-
Rights doctrine in construction of the Fourteenth Amendment privileges-or-immunities 
clause.  For example, this might be done as a matter of judicial economy—the federal 
doctrine has already been developed.  Or it might be done for reasons of fairness—those 
persons whose rights are invaded by state governments should be treated similarly to 
those rights that are invaded by the federal government.  Of course, the claim in this 
Article is not that these arguments are correct.  They are offered solely for the purpose of 
illustrating the way in which wholesale incorporation of federal Bill-of-Rights doctrine 
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C.  Incorporation and Irreducible Ambiguity 
Many problems of constitutional ambiguity can be resolved by constitutional 
interpretation—the public context of constitutional utterance may be 
sufficient to resolve questions about the public meaning of a text with 
more than one acontextual conventional semantic meaning.  But it is at 
least theoretically possible that there are cases of irreducible 
constitutional ambiguity. 
At an abstract level we might distinguish between two distinct types of 
irreducible ambiguity.  We can use the phrase “epistemic ambiguity” to 
refer to situations in which the original public meaning (the meaning at 
the time a constitutional provision was framed and ratified) could be 
resolved based on the contextual clues and linguistic knowledge 
available to the public of that time, but in which the passage of time has 
resulted in the loss of some of the essential information.  For example, 
contemporary knowledge of archaic patterns of usage may be not be 
sufficiently rich and detailed to permit disambiguation of utterance that 
depend on subtle distinctions among the various senses of a given word.  
Or information about the context of constitutional utterance may have 
been lost: for example, the publicly available context of constitutional 
utterance may include information conveyed orally that was never 
recorded in written texts, or all of the texts that recorded the information 
may have been lost. 
Epistemic ambiguity can be contrasted with what we can call “ontological 
ambiguity.”  It may be the case that some constitutional provisions were 
irreducibly ambiguous for the public at the time of origination.  There 
could be several reasons why this might be the case, including the 
following two. 
First, it might be the case that the framers of a particular provision 
deliberately chose to employ ambiguous language.  Such deliberate ambiguity 
might be chosen in order to achieve sufficient votes to propose or to 
secure ratification of a controversial provision. 
Second, it might be the case that the framers of a constitutional 
provision were unaware of an ambiguity in the language that they chose.  
This might result from partial linguistic isolation of the framers of a 
particular provision from the larger linguistic community.  For example, 
members of Congress who draft a constitutional amendment might mutually 
reinforce one another in assuming that the intended meaning of a 
particular expression is the unambiguous public meaning.  This phenomenon 
might involve path dependence.  For example, if a potential ambiguity 
 
must be justified as a construction (as distinguished from an interpretation) of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
INCORPORATIONANDORIGINALISTTHEORY.DOC 1/20/10  12:36 PM 
[VOL. 18:  409, 2009]  Incorporation and Originalist Theory 
  JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES. 
 441 
goes unnoticed early in the drafting process, the interaction among 
drafters might reinforce the intended meaning, so that the ambiguity 
becomes “invisible” or sounds “absurd” among the group of drafters.  
Such linguistic isolation may be reinforced in circumstances where there 
are political reasons or practical reasons to limit the drafting process to 
“insiders.” 
If there were provisions of the constitution that were irreducibly 
ambiguous, this fact would present a challenge for originalist theory.  
What should an originalist say when constitutional interpretation yields 
the conclusion that a particular constitutional provision has one of two 
potential meanings?  The appropriate response might depend on the 
question whether the ambiguity at hand was epistemic or ontological.  In 
the case of epistemic ambiguity, some originalists might take the position 
that contemporary constitutional actors should adopt the interpretation 
that is most likely to be correct, even if the level of certainty associated 
with that judgment is very low. 
But in the case of ontological ambiguity, this option is not available.  
In such cases, ambiguity is the bottom line of interpretation.  The 
semantic content or linguistic meaning of the provision simply is ambiguous 
as a matter of fact.  In such cases, construction is required to apply the 
rule in a determinate fashion to any case in which the ambiguity makes 
practical difference.  (There may be many cases in which the ambiguity 
would not make a difference—the same part would win under either 
interpretation.)  How might such construction proceed?  There are many 
possibilities.  One might take precedent or historical practice as influential 
or even decisive—in cases in which such practice or precedent would 
resolve the ambiguity.  Keith Whittington suggests that construction 
should generally be guided by a principle of deference to the political 
branches, and that construction outside the judiciary is a political process.51  
Randy Barnett suggests construction should be guided or constrained by 
a principle of constitutional legitimacy that requires reasonable assurances 
of just outcomes: this mode of construction might require judges to make 
substantive judgments about the justice of alternative constructions.52 
None of this suggests any particular position on incorporation under 
the Bill of Rights via the privileges or immunities clause.  Rather, the 
 
 51. See WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 20; WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 20, at 6. 
 52. See BARNETT, supra note 20, at 126. 
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point of this discussion is to highlight the possibility that irreducible 
ambiguity in the meaning of the privileges or immunities clause might 
require constitutional construction.  When it comes to specific methods 
of constitutional construction, many or most originalists may agree that 
construction should be bounded by original meaning—at least in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances.53  But originalists disagree about 
the proper approach to constitutional construction within those bounds.  That 
is hardly surprising.  The content of theories of constitutional construction is 
outside the core commitments of originalism to the fixation thesis and 
the contribution thesis. 
V.  FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION 
One final topic remains before we conclude.  What, if anything, might 
originalists say about the possibility that some provisions of the 
constitution lack original meaning altogether?  Could an originalist reach 
the conclusion that the privileges or immunities clause is an inkblot?  
And how might originalists respond to this possibility? 
A.  Failure of Constitutional Communication in Theory 
The Constitution contains many provisions that are vague.  And it is 
not implausible to believe that the Constitution contains some provisions 
that are irreducibly ambiguous as between a constrained set of possible 
original meanings.  But could an originalist accept the possibility that 
there are provisions of the constitution that are literally meaningless?  Of 
course, it is not difficult to imagine possible constitutions that contain 
meaningless provisions: “Amendment 57: In the event of purple 
mellifluousness, the mome raths shall grabe.”  Or if you think you 
understand that, try this: “Amendment 58: k3! 0ck"dk1c#$.”  Or 
even this %. 
 
 53. Of course, “extraordinary circumstances” needs to be defined or clarified.  
Some of the relevant considerations are discussed in the next Part of this Article. See 
infra Part 0, “V.  Failure of Constitutional Communication,” p. 442. 
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But the United  States Constitution does 
not contain gibberish, meaningless strings of 
symbols, or inkblots.  It does, however, contain 
provisions that some readers have characterized 
as the functional equivalent of inkblots.  When 
asked about the Ninth Amendment in 
confirmation hearings, Judge Bork responded: 
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know something of 
what it means. For example, if you had an amendment that says “Congress shall 
make no” and then there is an inkblot and you cannot read the rest of it and that 
is the only copy you have, I do not think the court can make up what might be 
under the inkblot if you cannot read it.54 
And Bork has made a similar suggestion with respect to the privileges or 
immunities clause.55  Pace Bork,56 it seems unlikely that there are any 
cases of catastrophic failure of constitutional meaning in the actual 
Constitution of the United States.  Constitutional provisions are drafted 
with care, and it would be extraordinarily unusual for a constitutional 
provision with no meaning at all to survive the process of framing and 
ratification. More plausible is the possibility that a constitutional provision 
would be radically ambiguous—with multiple meanings that would have 
widely divergent implications for constitutional practice. 
B.  The (Hypothetical) Case for the Failure of the                               
Privileges or Immunities Clause 
In the case of the privileges or immunities clause, it is at least 
conceivable that the clause suffers from multiple and complex forms of 
irreducible ambiguity.  Suppose, for example, that the drafters mistakenly 
believed that the public would generally recognize the phrase “privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States” as a term of art, but in 
 
 54. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 224 
(1987) (statement of Judge Robert H. Bork); see also Kurt T. Lash, Of Inkblots And 
Originalism: Historical Ambiguity and the Case of the Ninth Amendment,  31 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 467, 469 (2008). 
 55. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 166 (1990). 
 56. On the meaning of the Ninth Amendment, see Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth 
Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2006); Lash, supra note 54, at 
467. 
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fact this recognition was highly inconsistent, with some readers assuming 
that “privileges or immunities” simply meant “rights” and others assuming 
that it carried a technical legal meaning.  It might further be the case that 
some readers of the phrase would believe that the meaning of “of” is “by 
virtue of” and other readers would believe that the relevant sense of “of” 
was “shared by all.”  In these circumstances, the meaning of the clause 
might be so ambiguous that we might be tempted to say that there had been 
a failure of constitutional communication.  If the privileges or immunities 
clause could be either a natural rights clause or shared-rights clause or a 
clause that is limited to those rights that citizens possess by virtue of 
their national citizenship, the different senses corresponding to constitutional 
doctrines that have little in common with each other. 
If the scenario hypothesized in the prior paragraph were actually the 
case (and I am not suggesting that it is), then we might be tempted to 
characterize the privileges or immunities clause as a case of the failure 
of constitutional meaning. 
C.  Incorporation as a Mending Construction 
Failures of constitutional meaning require constitutional construction.  
If a given constitutional provision has no linguistic meaning or that 
meaning is radically ambiguous, then the translation of semantic content 
into legal content cannot proceed mechanically or automatically.  A 
constitutional construction of some kind is required; without a construction, 
constitutional actors would have no basis for the application of the 
provision to a particular case.  So the question inevitably would arise: 
“how should the constitution be construed if there has been a failure of 
constitutional communication?” 
Once again, there are various possibilities.  One of these would simply 
be to declare the meaningless clause to be “null and void,” but this is not 
the only alternative.  Another possibility is to adopt the constitutional 
equivalent of a “saving construction.”57  Originalists are generally committed 
to the principle that constitutional constructions must be consistent with 
the semantic content or linguistic meaning of the Constitution.  A 
construction that is inconsistent with the original meaning of the 
constitutional text might be labeled an amending construction—and both 
originalist theory and conventional legal practice agree that that judges 
do not have the authority to amend the Constitution. 
But there may be some cases in which the commitment to the constitution 
requires a construction that is inconsistent with original meaning of the 
text.  Here is a science fiction example: suppose that a plague resulted in 
 
 57. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 15 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997). 
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the death of all persons who were 35 years of age or older.  The text of 
the Constitution would result in the conclusion that no one could 
constitutionally serve as the President of the United States, but were this 
bizarre (and from my perspective terribly unfortunate) turn of events to 
transpire, constitutional actors would surely adopt a construction of the 
Constitution that preserved constitutional government.  They would 
adopt a “mending construction” of Article II that repaired the tear in the 
constitutional fabric. 
The notion of a mending construction might be adapted to the problem 
of failures of constitutional meaning.  In the case of the privileges or 
immunities clause, the doctrine of incorporation might be justified as 
such a mending construction.  It might be argued that the privileges or 
immunities clause simply fails to provide sufficient guidance for identification 
of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.  One 
might then label the provision an Inkblot, and simply write it out of the 
constitution altogether—this might be Judge Bork’s preferred alternative.  
Or one might adopt a construction of the privileges and immunities 
clause that preserves its formal existence, but defines “privileges and 
immunities” so narrowly that the clause will provide an absolute 
minimum of constraint on state governments—this may be the approach 
adopted by the majority in the Slaughterhouse Cases.  Or one might go a 
different route and adopt the doctrine of incorporation as a mending 
construction—not because incorporation is required by the linguistic 
meaning of the text, but because this construction is supported by a 
variety of concerns—furthering the purposes of the clause, conforming 
to the expectations of some or many of those who participated in its 
framing and ratification, limiting judicial discretion, achieving justice, 
and so forth. 
VI.  CONCLUSION: WHY INCORPORATION MATTERS FOR ORIGINALISTS 
As a practical matter, the doctrine of incorporation is of great practical 
significance.  If originalist theory were to provide decisive reasons for 
either affirming or rejecting incorporation, those reasons would certainly 
imply that originalism has “bite.”  Some originalists may believe 
that incorporation should be rejected on originalist grounds; others may 
believe the opposite.  In this Article, I have suggested that originalists 
should be interested in debates over incorporation for an additional and 
quite different reason.  Incorporation puts originalism through the wringer— 
it forces originalists to consider a complex set of issues that push the 
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limits of originalist theory.  Originalism must confront the tension 
between their commitments to “normal meanings” and a constitution 
that contains technical terms.  Originalism must address the relationship 
between originalist interpretation and constitutional construction.  And 
originalism may be required to give a well-theorized account of the 
failure of constitutional meaning. 
 
